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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
GUI DANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS: 
C S M  SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM G I M B A L  ACTUATORS 
B y  Will iam A. McMahon 
Lyndon B. Johnson  Space Cen te r  
SUMMARY 
In February 1962, the decision was reached to use a service propulsion system 
engine that would be gimbaled at the engine throat. This concept selection meant that 
some type of gimbal actuator was required to provide thrust vector control. After 
completion of a trade-off study of types of actuators, the electromechanical concept 
was chosen over the electrohydraulic o r  hydraulic blowdown concepts as the means of 
servoactuator control of the engine thrust vector. 
Design and development of adequate lunar mission hardware proved to be a dif- 
ficult undertaking. Use of the electromechanical actuator design selected in lieu of the 
more conventional hydraulic actuators for engine gimbaling dictated advancement in 
magnetic-particle clutch design. Throughout development and qualification programs, 
the magnetic-particle clutch design continued to be the major problem area. 
The vendor fo r  the service propulsion system actuators produced several experi- 
mental hardware designs befo’re settling on the design la ter  to be known as the Mod 0 
configuration. The basic design did not change appreciably after the Mod 0 configura- 
tion was  completed. Actuators of the Mod 0, Mod I, Mod 11, and Mod IIA configura- 
tions were qualified during the Apollo Program. Each configuration was qualified for 
the flight profile imposed. Al l  configurations were used at some stage of the Apollo 
Program, but only the Mod IIA was qualified for a manned lunar mission. 
The greatest  single factor requiring changes from the Mod 0 and Mod I designs 
was overheating of the magnetic-particle clutches, which limited the force gain of the 
clutch and, hence, the maximum rate capability. Additional problems with the clutches 
and changes to the position transducer were the primary reasons for adopting the 
Mod IIA configuration. Successful completion of each mission without anomalies at- 
tributable to the actuators indicates that the particular configuration in  use w a s  ade- 
quate for  the flight profile imposed. 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The development of the service propulsion system (SPS) gimbal actuators was 
begun in  1962. It was decided that the SPS engine would be positioned by electrome- 
chanical actuators as a result of a trade-off study of electromechanical versus two 
types of hydraulic systems. Improvements to the state of the a r t  for electromechanical 
actuators were required to meet the lunar mission objectives. This report describes 
the evolution of the Apollo SPS gimbal actuators from the description in the first state- 
ment of work through qualification of hardware for the lunar landing. Particular atten- 
tion is given to problems encountered. 
A s  an aid to the reader,  where necessary the original units of measure have been 
converted to the equivalent value in  the Systkme International d'Unites (SI). The SI 
units are written f i rs t ,  and the original units a r e  written parenthetically thereafter. 
ACTUATOR CONCEPTS 
The basic concept for the SPS actuators was to provide thrust vector control 
(TVC) for the gimbaled SPS engine for all firing modes. A representative actuator 
configuration is shown in figure 1. In February 1962, it was decided that the SPS 
engine would be gimbaled at the engine throat and that some type of gimbal actuator 
would be required. At about the same time, the prime contractor made a trade-off 
study of three types of gimbal system actuators : electromechanical, electrohydraulic, 
and hydraulic blowdown. The basic system requirements considered during the trade- 
off study were performance, power requirements, system weight, maintenance and 
service, system compactness, reliability, and growth. Table I presents a summary 
of the trade-off factors,  and table 11 l is ts  the basic system requirements. 
The electromechanical actuators concept was selected in  July 1962 on the basis 
of the trade-off factors. The electromechanical actuator was noted to be self-contained, 
whereas the use of hydraulic actuators would have required the addition of a hydraulic 
system (viz., hydraulic power supply, lines, valves, etc. ) o r  a high-pressure gas 
system. The electromechanical actuator w a s  heavier than the hydraulic actuators; 
but, when the required hydraulic systems were added, the electromechanical system 
showed a weight advantage. The electromechanical actuator was considered more ef- 
ficient with less total power used. Checkout and maintenance were considered simpler 
fo r  the electromechanical actuator. Leaks and fluid contamination are detrimental to 
the operation of hydraulic systems, and no such system had been operated in  space a t  
the time the studies were made. 
The original specifications, based on engineering judgment, were established 
without knowing exactly what would be needed fo r  control-system stability. It W a s  
recognized that refinement of specifications might be necessary as knowledge of total 
vehicle requirements increased. Specific changes - and the rationale fo r  these 
changes - are shown where configuration changes a r e  described. 
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TABLE I .  - SYSTEM EVALUATION TRADE-OFF FACTORS 
Factor 
Advantages 
Disadvantages 
Weight, kg (11: 
Reliability 
~ 
Hydraulic blowdown system 
Simplicity 
Few parts 
No motor 
Established reliability 
values 
Compatible with Apollo 
concept 
Compatible with space 
environment 
Possible leaks 
Not self-contained 
Fluid contamination 
High-pressure system 
(fabricated) 
Several servovalves 
Additional onboard fluid 
capacity 
High weight for equivalent 
reliability 
Low stiffness 
a18. 1 to 20.4 (40 to 45) 
0.999978 
- 
Electrohydraulic system 
Lightweight 
Established reliability 
values 
Choice of power source 
allowed 
Possible leaks 
Not self-contained 
Fluid contamination 
Additional onboard 
fluid capacity 
Low pump and motor 
reliability 
Servicing and storage 
Several components 
Moving parts 
Low efficiency 
Low stiffness 
a18. 1 to 20.4 (40 to 45) 
0.999966 
Electromechanical system 
Lightweight 
Compact 
Self-contained 
Efficient 
Less total power 
Stiffer system 
Simpler checkout and 
maintenance 
Common power source 
No piping, valves 
Slightly higher peak 
power demand 
Hermetic seal required 
%Iydraulic fluids and associated piping and valving not included. 
TABLE II. - BASIC SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Gimbal deflection, 6,  deg . . . . . . . . .  
Deflection rate,  6, rad/sec . . . . . . . .  
Acceleration rate,  b’, rad/sec . . . . . .  
Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2 
Power requirements . . . . . . . . . . .  
* 10 
*.35 
i 3 . 5  
0.99996 
Minimal 
22.6 to 2 
0.999981 
3 (50 to 58) 
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Figure 1. - Electromechanical gimbal actuator for the SPS. 
Y 
I 
Figure 2.- Engine mount for the SPS. 
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Figure 3 . -  Gimbal mount for the SPS. 
Dual magnetic clutch 
Items within dotted black 
not furnished by prime 
contractor. 
Figure 4. - Gimbal actuator concept. 
DESIGN 
In April 1962, a contract for supplying the SPS engine (including actuators and 
gimbal system) was awarded. The engine mount and gimbal mount are depicted in  
figures 2 and 3, respectively. The SPS engine contractor initially awarded the actuator 
contract to a vendor in July 1962. Structural integrity verification was begun in  Decem- 
ber 1962 with the completion of the f i r s t  breadboard units. Figure 4 presents a picto- 
rial representation of the actuator concept as of August 1962, and table Ill l is ts  the 
actuator design requirements as of the same date. The position feedback was to have 
been provided by a gimbal angle transducer located in  the gimbal assembly. By No- 
vember 1962, the position feedback was  included internal to the actuator via a linear 
variable differential transformer.  Four linear position transducer channels were 
included in one package, and three separate velocity transducers were included i n  the 
original specification. By September 1963, several changes had been made in  the 
specifications. The changes included using only three position transducer channels and 
two rate transducers. Two position and two rate transducers were used to provide re- 
dundancy. The third position transducer provided display information. Table IV shows 
the changed actuator requirements as of November 1963 and the basis for  each change. 
The earliest design parameters  were selected on the basis of engineering judgment. 
Detailed investigations were made of the parameters,  and additional parameters were 
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TABLE III. - ACTUATOR DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AS OF AUGUST 1962 
3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 Acceleration, rad/sec 
Angular rate,  rad/sec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0.35 
Chamber excursion, deg 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Actuator weight, kg (lb) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9.5 to 10.5 (21 to 23) 
Power requirement: 
Peakpower, W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Continuous duty power, W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Normal operating power, W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
1200 
5 00 
550 
Force output requirement: 
Peak force output, N (lbf) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Continuous duty force, N (Ibf) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Normal operating force, N (lbf) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
5783 (1300) 
3114 (700) 
2447 (550) 
TABLE IV. - GIMBAL ACTUATOR REQUIREMENTS AS OF NOVEMBER 1963 
Parameter 
Travel: 
Pitch, deg . . . . . . . . . . .  
Yaw, deg . . . . . . . . . .  
Rate, rad/sec . . . . . . . . .  
Acceleration, rad/sec . . . .  
Force,  N (lbf) . . . . . . . . .  
2 
Value 
-t6 
i8.5 
0.3 
3.0 
6672 (1500) 
Basis of requirement 
Vehicle center-of-gravity 
excursion plus authority 
Vehicle center-of-gravity 
excursion plus authority 
Stability of autopilot 
- -  
Acceleration reaction resulting 
from vehicle angular 
acceleration thrust 
misalinement 
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added when the procurement specification w a s  written. Consideration w a s  given to such 
i tems as vehicle center-of-gravity excursions, autopilot stability, thrust misalinement, 
and maximum force requirements caused by vehicle angular acceleration, Hardware 
state-of-the-art knowledge and experience played an important par t  i n  actuator develop- 
ment because virtually all previous actuators of this size had been hydraulic o r  electro- 
hydraulic and had not needed the redundancy and reliability required of these units. 
Weight and power consumption were also important considerations from the beginning 
of this development. 
Implementation of design parameters was begun in  June 1962 when the vendor 
began building breadboard units. During the period from July 1962 to July 1964, the 
vendor supplied the following actuators. 
Number of se t s  Design Performance 
2 A Breadboard - high hysteresis 
4 B Low power 
4 C Low response 
7 D Poor quality control and poor job performance 
Initially, despite failure of the vendor to meet all specifications, i t  was thought that 
design deficiencies could be eliminated. The vendor moved his operations from one 
plant to another early in  the development of these actuators and, from that time on, 
was not able to provide quality control in accordance with Apollo Program requirements. 
A s  a consequence, the SPS engine contractor elected to choose a new vendor as an alter- 
nate source,  and a contract to this effect w a s  initiated on October 9, 1963. 
Breadboard testing was  begun by the new vendor in  December 1963, and the f i r s t  
breadboard units were delivered to the SPS engine contractor in  January 1964. The 
new vendor's design w a s  considered complete at this time. A s  in  the case of the initial 
vendor, the f i r s t  units did not meet the specifications as defined. The first 11 se ts  
were low in  strength, stiffness, and rate  of travel. Three sets  of the second design 
were built, and all were below specification requirements for rate.  Units built as a 
third design were later referred to as Mod 0 actuators with the advent of a redesign to 
be known as Mod I. The basic design did not change appreciably af ter  the Mod 0 con- 
figuration was completed. 
DEVELOPMENT 
A great amount of testing was  performed in an effort to formulate a final design 
for  the SPS actuators. All units built by the initial vendor were built to specifications 
predating the Mod 0 configuration. The third generation of the new vendor's design 
became known as the Mod 0 configuration in  March 1965. At that time, i t  was deter- 
mined that the Mod 0 specifications could not be met and that, i f  use  of the electrome- 
chanical actuator were to continue, design requirements would have to be relaxed. The 
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most significant problem was  the inability of the actuator to meet rate-of-travel re-  
quirements. The testing of the Mod 0 flight configuration (May to June 1965) disclosed 
the following actuator problems. 
1. Brush failures resulting from a brush-bounce problem 
2. Rod-end bearing failures 
3. Excessive gear wear caused by a metallurgical (hardness) problem 
4 .  Clutch failures resulting from overheating 
5.  Inadequate performance 
6. Position transducer failures caused by misalinement 
In Apr i l  1965, a new procurement specification for Mod I actuators was prepared 
that reflected the limits of performance believed to be attainable at  that time. This 
specification reduced the actuator ra te  requirement with a 289 1-newton (650-pound) 
sideload from the Mod 0 value of 0.30 rad/sec to the Mod I value of 0.227 rad/sec. 
Program management chose to remove the abort requirement in the stabilization and 
control system (SCS) change- in- velocity (AV) mode to ease the specification require- 
ments. In addition, the Mod I design provided for the five following hardware changes. 
1. Hardened bull-gears using the same material with a nitriding process 
2. Clutch brush improvements and a retainer 
3. A clutch bearing insert  
4.  Precision rod-end bearings 
5.  A modified valve cap for actuator pressurization 
The greatest single factor making it necessary to change from both the Mod 0 and 
the Mod I configurations was overheating of the magnetic-particle clutches, which lim- 
ited the force gain and hence the maximum ra te  capability. In going from Mod 0 to 
Mod I, consideration w a s  given to providing a liquid-fluorinated-hydrocarbon cooling 
system to keep the clutches cool under load; however, this system was  not added. 
Force gain reading for the actuators w a s  reduced to 13.34 f 4 . 4 5  N/mA (3.0 f 1.0 
lbf/mA); and, a s  stated previously, the abort requirement in the SCS AV mode was 
eliminated. Clutch heating over the period of required operation and under the speci- 
fied loads continued to be a problem with the Mod I design; consequently, an intensive 
study w a s  initiated in December 1965 to determine if it were possible to reduce further 
the rate  requirements for TVC. The hardware changes recommended for  a Mod II 
configuration were a s  follows. 
a 
1. Reduced clutch speed, requiring new gear sizing and component respacing 
(new housing) 
2. Position transducer redundancy 
3. Thrust bearing improvements 
4. A high-temperature clutch 
a. A metal container 
b. Glass-impregnated redundant seals 
c. A stronger bearing housing 
The primary change was a reduction in  maximum ra te  from 0.227 to 0.10 rad/sec. It 
was determined by simulation and by a better knowledge of the SCS/reaction control 
system (RCS)/SPS interrelationships that large signal stability of the SCS could be 
reduced. Initial offsets in engine rate  and attitude were determined to be much smaller 
than originally anticipated. The RCS was  able to keep rates down to a minimum and 
c. g. locations were predicted with greater accuracy; hence, the startup transients 
supported a decrease in actuator rate. 
Once the Mod II configuration was built and tested, it appeared that a design had 
been achieved which was satisfactory for TVC; however, qualification testing demon- 
strated the need for additional improvement in the clutch design. Qualification testing 
disclosed some errat ic  behavior in ramp rate response in certain clutch assemblies. 
Investigation showed that the drag cups o r  rotors of these clutches became warped dur- 
ing use;  the warpage was  believed to cause the clutches to bind intermittently during 
operation. This defect caused out-of-tolerance conditions during ramp rate  response 
tests. No clutch failed because of this anomalous condition; however, i t  was  believed 
to be serious enough to merit further design changes. The clutch rotor was modified 
to a slotted configuration that prevented the rotor warpage that had occurred previously 
in  Mod II configurations. The position transducer assembly was modified by removal 
of one transducer slug, separation of the remaining two slugs with a T-bar arrange- 
ment, and changes in  the shear pins of the feedback arm.  These changes were deemed 
necessary to prevent loss of position feedback by loss  of more than one channel of the 
actuator. One position transducer was  connected to each actuator channel. Displays 
were driven by the active actuator channel. The configuration incorporating the clutch 
modification and position transducer changes was known as the Mod IIA. 
QUALIFICATION HARDWARE 
Research and development testing of the Mod 0 configuration was  completed in 
September and October 1965; a month la ter ,  hardware qualification of Mod 0 actuators 
for  the Apollo AS-201 mission (spacecraft 009) w a s  completed. A formal qualification 
report  was not issued for this configuration; however , certification test requirements 
were satisfied, as far as actuators were concerned, by the issuance and acceptance of 
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the engineering analysis report  dated November 24, 1965. The actuators were qualified 
specifically for the Apollo AS- 201 unmanned suborbital mission. 
Research and development testing of the Mod I design was completed in  Janu- 
a ry  1966, and qualification tests were begun. Actuator qualification was completed in 
May 1966. Block I SPS engine qualification was completed in  March 1966. The actua- 
tor data from engine firings at Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, 
Tennessee, became a part  of the actuator qualification documented in  June 1967; the 
data fulfilled the certification test requirement fo r  Block I. After several  delays caused 
by research and development testing, qualification testing of the Mod II actuator was 
completed i n  the f i rs t  half of 1967. 
The Mod IIA qualification program was begun in November 1967 and was com- 
pleted i n  April 1968. During this period, a penalty qualification program was run to 
verify low-temperature tests using corrected procedures. In addition, an augmented 
test program was initiated in  June 1968 to increase confidence in the hardware for  all 
manned flights. This test  program demonstrated that the hardware was capable of 
longer life and could operate in  a more severe environment than was required in  the 
original specification. 
FLIGHT HARDWARE 
The development and qualification of flight hardware led to many changes f rom 
the original plans for  flight hardware. On several  occasions, actuators were removed 
from flight vehicles a t  the prime contractor facility o r  a t  the NASA John F. Kennedy 
Space Center because of some malfunction o r  reasonable doubt of flightworthiness. 
These removals usually led to the substitution of upgraded hardware such as Mod I fo r  
Mod 0 and Mod 11 fo r  Mod I. The following hardware configurations were used on the 
Apollo flights indicated. 
Flight 
AS-201 (unmanned) 
Spacecraft 
009 
Actuator 
Mod 0 
AS- 202 (unmanned) 011 Mod I 
AS-501 (unmanned) 017 Mod II 
Apollo 6 (unmanned) 020 Mod II 
Apollo 7 and subsequent (all manned) 101 and subsequent Mod IIA 
FLI GHT H I  STORY 
The SPS gimbal actuators were used in  all Apollo flights beginning with space- 
NO anomalies were observed in the operation of the gimbal actuators craft 009. 
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o r  in the TVC that could be attributed to faulty operation of the actuators. Actuator con- 
figurations earlier than the Mod IIA configuratiqn were not qualified for a manned lunar 
mission. The certification test  requirements for each mission were met by the avail- 
able hardware. Successful completion of each mission without anomalies attributable 
to the actuators indicates that the particular actuator configuration in  use was  adequate 
fo r  the flight profile imposed. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
When Apollo Program managers decided to use a service propulsion system en- 
gine gimbaled at  the engine throat, the requirement for some type of gimbal actuator 
to provide thrust vector control came into being. Early trade-off studies indicated 
that an electromechanical design was superior to the more conventional electrohydrau- 
l ic and hydraulic blowdown systems. The electromechanical system was chosen on the 
bases of weight, compactness, power efficiency, system stiffness, ease of maintenance 
and servicing, and dependency on a common power source. 
Design and development of electromechanical actuator hardware qualified for 
manned lunar missions proved to be more difficult than originally envisioned. One 
actuator vendor-subcontractor delivered 1 7  unacceptable sets of four different designs 
before the engine contractor elected to choose a new vendor as an alternate source for 
the actuator. The second vendor delivered 14 unacceptable se t s  of two different de- 
signs before a third design (to become known as the Mod 0 configuration) was  found to 
be satisfactory. Three more designs (Mod I, 11, and IIA) followed as  the state-of-the- 
art improved, hardware requirements were changed, and total vehicle needs were more 
precisely defined. Although the Mod 0, I, and I1 configurations were not qualifiable for 
manned flight, they were adequate for the missions for which they were used. Exten- 
sive testing, retesting, and modification of the Mod 0 configuration were required to 
produce the actuator used for Apollo 7 and subsequent missions. 
Numerous minor modifications to par ts  design and materials were made in  the 
course of achieving the basic Mod 0 configuration. However, it became evident that 
design specifications could not be met using an electromechanical actuator unless cer- 
tain requirements were relaxed. The most significant problem was the inability of the 
actuator to meet rate-of-travel requirements, primarily because the magnetic-particle 
clutches overheated when maximum control current was  applied. While work to im- 
prove clutch performance continued, system requirements were reviewed to determine 
their validity. A s  a result, it was  ascertained that the maximum rate and load capa- 
bilities required of the actuator were unnecessarily stringent. Some requirements 
were relaxed and qualification of hardware suitable for manned rating was completed. 
An augmented test  program conducted to increase confidence in  the man-rated 
hardware demonstrated that the actuators could operate for a longer period in  a more 
severe environment than required in  the specifications. The useful life of the actuators 
was shown to be sufficient for the long-duration Skylab flights. 
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No anomali ttributable to actuator malfuncti n were experienced during 4 un- 
manned and 11 manned Apollo missions, demonstrating that the various configurations 
used were adequate for the flight profile imposed. 
I 
! 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, February 25, 1975 
914-50-30-02-72 
12 NASA-Langley, 1975 s-444 
